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L INTRODUCTION
So far, Florida's experiment with independent constitutional revision
commissions has not satisfied the expectations of its proponents. By
"independent," I mean a commission that places proposals to amend the
Florida Constitution directly upon the ballot with no intervening scrutiny
or adjustment by the Legislature. This separates Florida's two article XI
constitutional revision commissions' (that is, 1978 and 1998) and the 1991
Taxation and Budget Reform Commission (TBRC)2 from two earlier and
notably more successful commissions-the 1868 convention that produced
the 1868 Florida Constitution and the 1968 commission that produced the
1968 Florida Constitution. I refer to these two commissions as the
"successful commissions," meaning that their products were of genuine
political importance to constitutional governance in Florida.
The two successful commissions were driven by relatively cataclysmic
forces of necessity. The immediate post-Civil War Congress had demanded
that Florida and other "rebel" states from the recently concluded war
between the states revise their constitutions and governments as a
condition of resuming full status in the political structure of the national
government.3 Congress deemed the 1865 Florida Constitution, which had
been hastily adopted to supplant the 1861 secession constitution, to be
inadequate.4 Hence, the 1868 commission was driven by forces not unlike
* J.D., 1963, Michigan; M.S., 1961, Worcester Poly. Inst.; B.S., 1957, Duke University.
1. RtA. CONST. art. XI, § 2 (1999).
2. RtA. CONST. art. XI, § 6 (1999).
3. The Act of March 2, 1867, Chapter CLIII, found that no "legal state governments" then

existed in Florida and other seceded states and placed them under military rule, pending the
adoption of revised constitutions in convention, subject to Congress's approval. 14 U.S. Stat. 42829 (1867). This statute also required states to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution as a condition of restoration of representation in Congress. See id.
4. Congress enacted the Act of March 23, 1867, Chapter VI, authorizing the military

governor to oversee the creation of a convention. See 15 U.S. Stat. 2 (1867). This convention
produced the 1868 Florida Constitution.
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those that drove the great Philadelphia convention of 1787. In short, the

status quo would no longer work (if it ever did)-albeit for different
reasons.
While the conditions that stimulated the Florida Legislature to set the
1968 constitution revision commission to work were hardly as dire or as
compelling as those confronting the 1787 (national) and 1868 (Florida)
conventioneers, they were nonetheless of true constitutional import. For
almost 200 years, democratic governance in the United States (and since
1845 in Florida) was based largely upon equal representation of political
units within the states (that is, counties). In an abrupt volte-face, the civil
rights era United States Supreme Court (roughly 1960 to 1970) handed
down a series of decisions that retooled the theory of American democracy
to focus upon the individual rather than political entities as the basic unit
of representation.' The day of "one man-one vote" had arrived and, with
it, a compelling outside stimulus to reconsider Florida's basic governing
document.' In response, the Florida Legislature enacted' a statute creating
the 1968 constitution revision commission.' From this emerged the

5. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
6. An additional stimulus was the fact that the 1885 constitution had been amended upwards
of one hundred times and was deemed by the Legislature to be "outmoded." 1967 Fla. Laws ch.
1739.
7. In fact, the commission did its work in 1966 and its product formed the basis of what
became the 1968 Constitution.
8. See 1967 Fla. Laws ch. 65-561. The "1968" commission actually did its work in 1966.
The sequence of official acts that transpired to produce the 1968 revision proposal was extended.
In 1963, the Florida House of Representatives proposed an "additional method of revising or
amending" the entire constitution by creating a revision proposal in a regular or special session of
the Legislature. H.R.J. Res. 368 (Fla. 1963). This proposal was adopted in 1964. A year later, the
Florida Senate proposed making a constitutional revision convention by election ofthe people. See
S.J. Res. 115 (Fla. 1965). This proposal was adopted in 1965. In the meantime, the Legislature
enacted Chapter 65-561, Laws of Florida, which created the constitution revision commission and
charged it to "prepare and submit to the governor and to the members of the legislature and the
cabinet at least sixty (60) days prior to the convening of the 1967 session of the legislature its
reports and recommendations for revisions of the Constitution of Florida." 1967 Fla. Laws ch. 65561, § 2. The 1968 constitution revision commission is reported to have done its work in "a threeweek convention in Tallahassee," ending on December 16,1966. CommissionDraftsConstitution,
41 FLA. BAR J. 28 (1967) (setting forth the 1968 commission's proposed judicial article). The
Legislature received the commission's proposal in a specially called session on January 9, 1967.
See id. at 29. Moreover, ajoint legislative resolution requested the governor to call the Legislature
into special session on Monday, July 24, 1967 "for the purpose of considering constitutional
revision." S. Con. Res. 1739 (Fla. 1967). The Legislature convened in a "joint meeting" on July 31,
1967 "for the purpose of a presentation of Concepts of Constitutional Revision." H. R. Con. Res.
2-xxx (Fla. 1967). A subsequent joint resolution requested the governor to reconvene the
Legislature on August 21, 1967 to complete the work on the proposal that was adopted as the 1968
constitution. See S. Con. Res. 10-xxx (Fla. 1967).
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proposal 9 that became the 1968 Florida Constitution, but not before the
Legislature reviewed it and made revisions. 10
The 1968 revised Florida Constitution incorporated numerous "good
government" ideas of the reform minded commission, one of which called
for periodic review of the constitution by a group of reviewers whose
proposals would be submitted directly to the voters free of revision or
countermand by the Legislature. " Somehow the 1968 commission and the
reviewing Legislature deemed such a procedure to be free of the "politics"
that muddles and often taints or skews the Legislature's thinking. This
quaint notion of "politics-neutral" politics apparently captivated and
partially beguiled the critics of the time. The fact that the constitutional
revision commission plan that emerged reposed exclusive power to name
the presumably politically-neutral members of the review commissions in
the most powerful politicians of the state' 2 was slipped by or gobbled down
by the electorate without a hiccup. In any event, the ordinarily multifaceted
political forces that normally work in the Legislature-with the ultimate
political accountability diffused throughout the state among all of the
political constituencies-congealed upon the anointed few (that is, the
governor, et al.), one of whom is not elected (the chief justice). 3In short,
what was conceived of and sold to the people of Florida as a politics-free
review mechanism was in fact a gift of a rich political plum to the
politicians who happened to be the incumbents in the designated offices
when the time for appointing a constitutional revision commission rolled
around.
In hindsight, the workings of such a system are highly predictable. The
few elite appointers tend to appoint members who will support the
appointers' agendas. The governor tends to protect the office of governor;
the chief justice, the judiciary; and, the speaker and president, the
legislature. Beyond that, each of the few appointers tend to make
appointments in line with whatever current political horse the appointer is
then riding (that is, for or against abortion, school vouchers, and the like).

9. H.R.L Res. 1-2x (Fla. 1968); S.J. Res. 4-2x (Fla. 1968); S.J. Res. 5-2x (Fla. 1968).
10. The 1968 president of The Florida Bar (Marshall Criser) urged adoption of the revised
Constitution as proposed by the Legislature in a summer 1968 special session, but also noted that
the Legislature's proposal is "not as fine a work product as was produced by the Florida
Constitution Revision Commission." ConstitutionalRevision,42 FLA. B. J. 1034 (1968). President

Criser also opined, "it is a better constitution than we have now." Id.
11. See FLA. CONST. art. Xi, § 5.
12. See FL-A. CONST. art. XI § 2(a) (stating that the governor, the president of the senate, the
speaker of the house of representatives, and the chief justice of the supreme court shall appoint

members-with the attorney general attaining membership ex officio).
13. At the time the 1968 constitution was initially adopted, all justices were subject to
popular election. A 1976 amendment abrogated popular elections in favor of gubernatorial

appointments and retention elections. See FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 10, 11.
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Missing from all this is any built in force to seat persons who are well
prepared professionally to assess how well the existing state constitution
serves its proper fundamental purposes. Those purposes are to create a
governmental structure, to allocate powers among the departments, and to
limit the power of all governmental entities. The proper persons should be
well-prepared to adjudge what amendments might be beneficial, and
should be generally unencumbered with a narrow political agenda.
The 1998 Constitution Revision Commission (CRC) exemplified how
commissions appointed under the current process are likely to go astray.
Its members were generally appointed in line with the partisan views of the
few appointers. Once appointed, far from starting from a profound critique
of the existing document, the CRC went on a tour of public hearings
around the state to give the citizens an opportunity to vent. Much, if not
most, of this venting had little to do with proper issues of constitutional
dimension but, instead, extolled narrow ideological goals or expressed
frustrations with the Legislature's failure to enact the laws or institute the
programs the various speakers desired. In short, ordinary members of the
public readily took the opportunity to speak their minds with little or no
thought about its constitutional content. This is the nub of the defect in
Florida's constitutional revision commission plan. The touted "free of
legislative oversight" feature has transmogrified the ideal of an
independent, deliberative and expert evaluation of the basic governing
document of Florida into occasional super-legislative opportunities to
"one-up" the Legislature by constitutionalizing non-constitutional issues.
The revision commissions may accomplish this by proposing what
amounts to ordinary legislation through constitutional amendments
designed to overrule the Legislature's decisions and indecisions. Making
things worse in the case of the 1998 CRC, the Legislature provided the
commission itself enough money to permit it to serve as the chief public
lobbyist for the measures it proposed. So much for a politically neutral
revision mechanism.
In the American sense of a constitution, the proper purposes of a state
constitution are but three: to organize a form of government, to allocate
powers and functions among its departments; and, to place limits on its
powers to protect the rights of the people collectively and individually.
Any legitimate mechanism for revising a state constitution must be
directed toward these ends. In addition, proposed revisions of a state
constitution-and the constitution of the State of Florida in
particular-should be conceived in the context of the most basic premise
of state constitutional law; namely, that the state constitution is not a grant
of power but is a limitation on the power of the state, primarily the

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol52/iss2/9
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legislature. 4 Under this theory, a most basic state constitution would do no
more than create a legislature and vest it with the lawmaking power of the
state. By virtue of its ancestry in the evolution of the English Parliament, 5
such a legislature would be possessed of inherent and unlimited authority
to enact laws to organize the remainder of the government as it saw fit.
From the premise that the people's duly elected legislature possesses
plenary law making power follows the corollary principle that every
additional provision added to a state constitution has the direct or indirect
effect of limiting the power of the Legislature. These limits operate to
deprive the Legislature of the power to do some things it might otherwise
choose to do (that is, enact an income tax on the income of natural
persons); 6 or, to deny the Legislature the power to ban a public policy it
would otherwise oppose (for example, requiring members of the
Legislature to make public disclosure of their finances); 7 or, to limit the
processes the Legislature may invoke to exercise its law making powers
(that is, limits on the use of special laws). 8 These limits are imposed either
by directly curtailing the Legislature's powers, 9 by creating constitutional
offices and assigning them powers,2" and by constitutionalizing principles
of 'law,2 ' thereby placing them beyond the power of the legislature, the
executive, or the courts to modify or abridge (absent repudiation by the
United States Constitution). Given a third premise of state constitutional
law, that is, to prescribe one means of doing a thing in a constitution
deprives the Legislature of the power to do it any other way. 2
Constitutional provisions such as those that prescribe a structure of
government or a procedure for accomplishing governmental tasks (such as
enacting laws) deprive the Legislature of the power to repeal
the
3 or to change the mandated procedures. 24
structure
constitutional
Because of these constitutional premises, proposals to revise a mature,
14. See, e.g., Smathers v. Smith, 338 So. 2d 825, 827 (Fla. 1976).
15. See, e.g., Ponder v. Graham, 4 Fla. 23 (Fla. 1851); 1851 WL 1091, *6 (Fla.).
16. See FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 5(a) (1999).

17. See FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8 (1999).
18. See FLA. CONST. art. II, §§ 10, 11 (1999).
19. See FLA. CONST. art. 1 (1999) (as in the limitations imposed by, the Declaration of

Rights).
20. See FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (regarding the governor); FLA. CONST. art. V, § 1 (1999)
(regarding the courts).
21. See FLA. CONST. artll
VII, § 5(a) (1999) (no tax shall be imposed on the incomes ofnatural
persons).
22. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Board of Pub. Instruction of Dade County, 217 So. 2d 553, 558
(Fla. 1968).
23. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 1 (1999) (prescribing the structure of courts in Florida, thereby
depriving the Legislature of the power to create new courts or eliminate those prescribed).
24. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 7 (1999) (prescribing the procedures the Legislature must
invoke to make valid laws).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2000

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 9
FLORIDA LAW REW

[Vol. 52

well-developed state constitution tend to fall into two categories: 1) those
that seek to deprive the Legislature (or some entity created by it or by the
constitution) of the power to do something someone does not like,' and 2)
those that go over the Legislature's head and force it to do something (or
render it powerless to stop something) that it had previously declined to
enact laws to accomplish.26 This state of political reality permits
constitutional revisers, including constitutional revision commissions, to
go over the head of the Legislature by constitutionalizing issues of
legislative character in the form of constitutional restrictions on legislative
power. Often, these measures are packaged to be nigh irresistible to the
voters. One of the first initiated amendments to the 1968 constitution
exemplifies this. It was a measure sponsored by then Governor Reuben
Askew to override the Legislature's unwillingness to enact an effective
statute requiring public officers and candidates for public office to disclose
their finances to the public.27 The effect of this amendment is straight
forward. Prior to its adoption, the Legislature possessed the power to
require financial disclosure or not, in its discretion. After adoption, it had
no power to repeal the constitutional standard.
To lay the ground work to evaluate the efforts of Florida's post-1968
constitution revision commissions, the reader must be supplied one
additional body of information. Embodied in the 1968 Florida Constitution
is a long standing policy that deprives the Legislature of the power to
impose a tax on the income of natural persons.28 Despite the apparent
satisfaction that this "no personal income tax" constitutional policy
registers with the Florida electorate, some presumably "progressive"
citizens believe the lack of a personal income tax deprives Florida of a well
balanced tax structure. This vacancy stands in the way of adequately
funding favored governmental services including, most notably, public
schools. It would not be off the mark to infer that some persons of this
view favored creating "politically-neutral" constitutional revision
commissions possessing power to place their proposals directly on the
ballot without legislative overview in the hope that "politics" would not

25. See FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 6 (1999) (taxing homestead properties); FLA. CONST. art. VII,
§ 6 (1999) (invading privacy of citizens).
26. See FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8 (1999) (providing for financial disclosure by government
officials); FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7 (1999) (providing adequate protection for natural resources).
27. In 1976 Governor Ruben Askew sponsored acitizen's amendment that added the "Ethics
in government" amendment to the constitution. See FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8 (1999).
28. See FIA. CONST. art. VII, § 5(a) (1999). As initially proposed by and adopted as an
amendment to the 1885 constitution, this provision stated: "No tax upon inheritances or upon the
income of residents or citizens of this state shall be levied by the State of Florida, or under its
authority. .. ." S.J. Res. 135 (Fla. 1923). Initially, the measure prohibited all income taxes but the
prohibition on corporate income taxes was partially lifted by an amendment sponsored by Governor
Askew. See FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 5(b) (1999).
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deter them from proposing to eliminate the prohibition against taxing
personal income. If this were true, the work of the first "politics-free"
CRC, convened in 1978, proved to be a disappointment. Although the
1978 CRC proposed a measure to assure that no tax on the income of
natural persons-if such a tax should ever be permitted-would be
imposed upon income from the sale of property that resulted from capital
gains that accrued after a specified date in 1971,9 it offered no proposal to
lift the ban on taxing personal income.
Despite this, the desire to see to a "non- political" revamping of taxing
powers permitted by the Florida Constitution did not abate. Although the
Legislature itself remained unwilling to propose a constitutional
amendment to lift the personal income tax ban, both houses did approve
a joint resolution in 1988 to propose a constitutional amendment to create
a second "politically neutral" revision commission. 0 The voters approved
this measure and amended the Florida Constitution to create the Taxation
and Budget Reform Commission (TBRC)3 Like the CRCs created in the
32
1968 constitution, the TBRC is appointed by current incumbent officials.
Unlike the CRCs, four non voting ex officio members are appointed from
among incumbents then serving in the Legislature (two appointed by the
speaker and two by the president). The constitution prescribes the
jurisdiction and functions of the TBRCs to include the authority to
examine the tax structure and funding needs of the state.33 The mission
29. This measure was intended to avoid a repetition of the Florida Supreme Court's decision
in Departmentof Revenue v. LeadershipHousing, Inc., 343 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1977), which had

permitted taxation of earlier accrued capital gains under the amendment that lifted the prohibition
on taxes on the income of corporations. See id. at 615. The corporate income tax amendment was
adopted by the voters in 1971, thereby adding article VII, section 6(b) of the Florida Constitution

(1999). Former Governor Askew was the chief proponent of the amendment.
30. See H.R.J. Res. 1616 (Fla. 1988).
31. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 6 (1999).

32. See id. at §6(a). Eleven members are appointed by the governor: seven each by the
speaker and the president; none by the chief justice.
33. See id. at § 6(d). This section provides:
(d)

The commission shall examine the state budgetary process, the revenue
needs and expenditure processes of the state, the appropriateness of the
tax structure of the state, and governmental productivity and efficiency;
review policy as it relates to the ability of state and local government to
tax and adequately fund governmental operations and capital facilities
required to meet the state's needs during the next twenty year period;
determine methods favored by the citizens of the state to fund the needs
of the state, including alternative methods for raising sufficient revenues
for the needs of the state; determine measures that could be instituted to
effectively gatherfunds fromexisting tax sources; examine constitutional
limitations on taxation and expenditures at the state and local level; and
review the state's comprehensive planning, budgeting and needs
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statement purports to confine the jurisdiction of the TBRCs to
constitutional issues, while no similar language confines the scope of the
work of CRCs.'
The first TBRC was convened in 1990 and subsequent commissions are
slated to be reestablished "each twentieth year thereafter."35 Like a CRC,
a TBRC is empowered to place proposals for "a revision of the
Constitution or any part of it dealing with taxation or the state budgetary
process" directly on the ballot for vote by the state's electorate. 36 Unlike a
CRC, a TBRC is empowered to refer proposals concerning taxation and
budgetary matters to the Legislature for statutory implementation.37 These
optional avenues for placing proposals either before the Legislature or the
electorate provide the TBRCs a legitimate scope of authority to propose
non-constitutional measures to the Legislature, but do not justify proposing
statutory measures in the guise of constitutional amendments.
The same constitutional amendment that created the TBRC38 also
amended the jurisdiction of the CRCs to deprive them of the power to
propose revisions pertaining to "matters relating directly to taxation or the
state budgeting process that are to be reviewed by the taxation and budget
reform commission." 39 In short, the initial TBRC plan called for granting
the TBRCs exclusive revision-commission authority to propose revisions
to the budget and taxation portions of the constitution. 40As things worked

assessment processes to determine whether the resulting information
adequately supports a strategic decision making process.

Id.
34. See id.
35. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 6(a) (1999).
36. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 6(e) (1999). This section provides:
(e)

The commission shall hold public hearings as it deems necessary to carry
out its responsibilities under this section. The commission shall issue a
report of the results of the review carried out, and propose to the
legislature any recommended statutory changes related to the taxation or
budgetary laws of the state. Not later than one hundred eighty days prior
to the general election in the second year following the year in which the
commission is established, the commission shall file with the secretary of
state its proposal, if any, of a revision of this constitution or any part of
it dealing with taxation or the state budgetary process.

Id.
37. See id.
38. See H.R.J. Res. 1616 (Fla. 1988).
39. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3(c) (1999).
40. That is, exclusive of the power of the CRCs; not exclusive to the powers of the
Legislature or popularly initiated amendments pursuant to article XI, sections 1 and 3 of the Florida

Constitution (1999).
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out, however, the product of the initial (1990) TBRC proved to be such a
flop that the Legislature proposed an amendment41 to remove this
restriction on the jurisdiction of the CRCs and to restore the entire
constitution to their purview. The voters adopted this measure in 1996.42
Consequently, as the Florida Constitution now stands, proposals to
revise taxation and budget provisions of the constitution may emerge every
twentieth year from CRCs (organized in calendar years ending in 2) and
every tenth year from TBRCs (organized in calendar years ending in 8).'
The fact remains, however, that the first three cracks at reform44 did not
produce a proposal to end the constitutional prohibition against taxing the
income of natural persons.
With the constitutional structure of the revision commissions described,
the effects of the commissions' thin efforts can now be reviewed. To date,
what have these "politics-free" commissions produced? The 1978 CRC
proposed eight separate ballot measures of varying degrees of importance,
composed in most instances of proposals to revise multiple sections of the
constitution. Revision No. 1 (1978), 45 which purported to pertain to the
"basic document," propounded revisions to nine separate articles of the
constitution and provided a schedule pertaining to implementation. Of
these, only a few were of legitimate constitutional status. These few
included a guarantee of binding arbitration in public employment wage
disputes, a right to assistance of counsel for any person called to testify
before a grand jury, a free standing right of privacy, and a constitutional
waiver of sovereign immunity as to certain tort and contract claims against
the state. Revision No.1 (1978) was rejected by the voters.
Revision No. 2 (1978) 46 proposed to add one word to the constitution.
The word "sex" as a personal characteristic would be protected against
state discrimination.47 This was the era in which the failure of the proposed
Equal Rights Amendment to the United States Constitution was still
41. S.J. Res. 210 (Fla. 1996).
42. Amending article XI, section 2 of the Florida Constitution to eliminate the restraints on
the scope of work available to CRCs.
43. CRCs shall convene in years ending in 7 commencing in 2017. See FLA. CONST. art. XI,
§ 2 (1999).
44. The 1978 and 1998 CRCs and the 1990 TBRC.
45. CONsTrrrIONALREvISION COMM'N, REvISION 1 (1978) (on file with Florida Secretary

of State). The 1998 CRC amendments abolish the office of secretary of state as a cabinet officer and
transfer the functions of the office to the "custodian of public records," and provided that the former
duties of the secretary of state "shall be as provided by law." FLA. CONsT. art. XII, § 24(b) (1999)
(effective January 7, 2003). To this date, the Legislature has enacted no statutes pertaining to the
custodian of public records and the office has no existence, except as indicated in the constitution.
46. CONsTrrunoNALREViSIONCOMM'N, REVISIoN2 (1978) (on file with Florida Secretary
of State).
47. That is, "[n]o person shall be deprived of any right because of race, religion, sex, or
physical handicaps." Id.
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smarting its proponents. Revision No.2 (1978) was rejected by the voters.
Revision No. 3 (1978) 48 referred solely to reapportionment of the
Legislature. This measure was of genuine constitutional importance in that
it proposed to transfer reapportionment authority away from the Legislature
into a Reapportionment Commission to be appointed by the governor, in
part from nominees submitted by the speaker, the president and minority
legislative leaders. 49 Revision No.3 (1978) was rejected by the voters.
Revision No. 4 (1978)50 proposed to eliminate the elective cabinet (that
is, secretary of state, attorney general, comptroller, treasurer, commissioner
of agriculture, and commissioner of education).51 This was perhaps the
most aggressive constitutional revision proposal made by any of the post1968 commissions. It would have reinstituted a strong governor for Florida
like none seen since the 1868 Constitution was supplanted by its 1885
successor.52 Revision No.4 (1978) was rejected by the voters.
Revision No. 5 (1978) 5" proposed to create a constitutional public
service commission and public counsel in the executive branch of
government. This would have displaced the statutory public service
commission and public counsel that function as agencies of the legislative
branch under the 1968 Constitution. 54 The apparent purpose was to deprive
the Legislature of the power to tinker with the regulatory operations of the
public service commission. Revision No. 5 (1978) was rejected by the
voters.
Revision No. 6 (1978) 51proposed to eliminate popular elections of trial
judges (circuit and county courts) and replace them with the merit selection

48.
of State).
49.
50.
of State).
51.

CONSTITUTIONALREVISION COMM'N, REVISION 3 (1978) (on file with Florida Secretary
See id.
CONSTrrUTIONALREVisiONCOMM'N, REVISION4 (1978) (on file with Florida Secretary
FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 4(a) (1999).

52. The 1868 Constitution vested "supreme executive power of the state" in the Governor.
FLA. CONST. art. V,§ 1 (1868). The 1868 constitution provided a cabinet of administrative officers
to "assist" the Governor. "consisting of a Secretary of State, Attorney General, Comptroller,
Treasurer, Surveyor General, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Adjutant General, and
Commissioner of Immigration." Unlike the 1968 constitution, these officers were appointed by the
Governor and possessed no power to participate in collegial decisions in the administration of the
general departments of government. See id. at § 17.
53. CONSTrrUTIONALREviSIONCOMM'NREVISION5 (1978) (on file with Florida Secretary
of State).
54. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 350.001, etseq. (1999); see also State ex reL Lee v. Kiesling, 632
So. 2d 601,603 (Fla. 1994) (acknowledging "The Public Service Commission is an entity of the
legislative branch.").
55. CONSTrrtmoNALREvIsioNCoMM'N, REviSION6 (1978) (on file with Florida Secretary
of State).
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and retention plan adopted in 1976 for justices. 6 Hostility to the election
of judges was evinced by both the 1978 and 1998 CRCs (and also by the
1968 revision commissions). Revision No.6 (1978) was rejected by the
voters.
Revision No. 7 (1978) 57 proposed to modify the structure of ad valorem
tax exemptions and also proposed to permit the Legislature to authorize
assessments of historic properties and solar energy installations on a basis
different from the "fair market value" standard that applies to all other
properties (except those in agricultural usage).5 8 This revision would have
also provided a safeguard against subjecting capital gains to property
accrued prior to the effective date of any future amendment that might lift
the restriction against taxing income of natural persons to such an income
tax. It would also have added a measure that, by operation of law, would
have regularly increased the portion of the value of homestead property
that is exempt from ad valorem taxation in accordance with the rate of
inflation in the economy. 9 Revision No.7 (1978) was rejected by voters.
Revision No. 8 (1978) 6 pertained solely to education. It would have
added this statement of purpose to the existing guarantee of a uniform
system of free public schools: "to develop the ability of each student to
read, communicate and compute and to provide an opportunity for
vocational training."61 The measure also proposed to strip the governor and
cabinet of the collegial power to act as the "state board of education" and
to transfer the function and name to a nine person board appointed by the
governor and confirmed by the senate.6 It also proposed to elevate the state
university system to constitutional status and to provide it with a nine
person governing board whose members would have been appointed by the
governor and confirmed by the senate.63 Revision No.8 (1978) was rejected
by the voters.
As noted above, all eight of the 1978 CRC's measures suffered defeat
at the hands of the voters. In part, this may have been caused by an overly
ambitious program that overwhelmed the voters.
Thereafter, the constitution was amended as described above to create

56. See S.J. Res. 49, 81 (Fla. 1976) (amending FLA. CONST. art. V, § 10(a)).
57. CONSTITUTIONALREVISION COMM'N, REVISION 7 (1978) (on file with Florida Secretary

of State).
58. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4(a). Article VII, section 4 has subsequently been amended to
permit "use" assessments on designated non-agricultural grounds.

59. As of November 1999, the portion of the assessed value of homestead property that is
exempt from ad valorem taxation is $25,000. See FLA. CONST. art. VH,§ 6 (1999).
60. CONSTIrUTIONALREVISION COMM'N, REVISION 8 (1978) (on file with Florida Secretary

of State).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See id.
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the TBRCs. The initial TBRC was organized in 1990 and placed four
separate proposals upon the 1992 general election ballot. TBRC revision
No. 1 proposed a massive measure prescribing details of how the
Legislature should go about budgeting for the state government, including
subsections with these headings: "Annual budgeting," "Appropriations
Bills format," "Appropriations Review process," "Seventy-two hour public
review period," "Final Budget Report," "Budget Stabilization Fund," and
"State Planning Document and Department and Agency Planning
Document Process." 64 This provision was approved by the voters and has
been incorporated into the constitution. 65 Although this measure may
embrace many "good ideas," few, if any of them could be said to be of
constitutional importance. In toto the massive verbosity constitutes little
more than a constitutionalized statute. It seems too bad that the 1990
TBRC did not glean out the one or two constitutional nuggets, if there were
any, from its proposal, and recommend the remaining bulk to the
Legislature for statutory enactment.
TBRC Revision No. 2 is the unfortunate "Taxpayers' Bill of Rights." 66
It was adopted by the voters and incorporated into the declaration of
rights.67 The measure states: "By general law the legislature should
prescribe and adopt a Taxpayers' Bill of Rights that, in clear and concise
language, sets forth taxpayers' rights and responsibilities and governments
responsibilities to deal fairly with taxpayers under the laws of this
state ....
,6 'This provision places no substantive limit on the power of the
state, but is a mere precatory plea to the Legislature of no legally
enforceable consequence. The 'Taxpayers' Bill of Rights" statute the
Legislature enacted is equally flaccid.69 It provides very little, if anything,
in the way of individual liberties beyond the ordinary requirements of due
process of law.7" Nevertheless, the truly unfortunate aspect of this measure
is not that it is flaccid, but that it was placed in the Declaration of Rights
article of the constitution rather than in the Taxation Article (article VII).
The Florida Supreme Court has stated that every provision of the
Declaration of Rights stands on equal footing with every other one. 71 If

64. TAXINGANDBUDGETREFORMCOMM'N,REVISION 1 (1990) (on file with Florida Secretary
of State).
65. See FIA. CONST. art. H,§ 19 (1999).
66. TAXINGANDBUDGErREF;ORMCOMM'N,REVISION2(1990) (on file with Florida Secretary
of State).
67. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 25 (1999).
68. Id.
69. See FLA. STAT. §§ 219.015, .018 (1999).
70. See id.
71. See Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 963 (Fla. 1992) ("Under our Declaration of Rights,
each basic liberty and each individual citizen has long been held to be on equal footing with every
other. Every particular section of the Declaration of Rights stands on an equal footing with every
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true, the constitutional pabulum of the vaunted "Taxpayers' Bill of
Rights"72 is entitled to equal dignity-no more or less-than the rights
protecting speech,73 religion,74 and trial by jury.75
TBRC Revision No. 3 proposed to devolve constitutional authority
upon Florida counties and municipalities to impose a one percent sales and
use tax upon "taxable transactions," subject to an approving vote of the
local electors.76 This exemplifies measures of the kind that express
dissatisfaction with the Legislature in not having authorized such a tax, as
it plainly possesses the power to do SO. 7 7 This measure would have been
the first step in decentralizing taxing authority in the state. It ran counter
to a policy to centralize taxing authority in the Legislature, which was a
primary objective of the taxation article of the 1968 revision. TBRC
Revision No.3 was rejected by the voters.
TBRC Revision No. 478 would have mandated that leasehold interests
in governmental real property created after November 5,1968 be subjected
to ad valorem taxes as real property; whereas, leaseholds of that sort
created before November 5, 1968 would be subjected to taxation as
intangible personal property. 79 This measure was of constitutional status
only because the existing constitution makes a distinction between the
taxation of intangible personal property (only by a state), 0 and taxation of
real property and tangible personal property (only by local governments). 81
TBRC Revision No. 4 was removed from the ballot by the Florida
Supreme Court upon a finding that it possessed a defective ballot
summary. 2 This is the only constitutional revision commission proposal
that has suffered this indignity, although some of the 1998 measures may

other section.").
72. An example of a taxpayer's Bill of Rights with true constitutional significance is CoLO.

CONST. art. 10, § 20. This measure requires voter approval of state and local tax increases. See id.
It was added by citizen's initiative. See also James F. Ford, Local Government, 27 RUTGERS L.J.
1243, 1252, n.45 (1996).

73. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 4 (1999).
74. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3 (1999).
75. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 22 (1999).
76. TAXINGANDBUDGETRE-ORMCOMM'N,REVISION3 (1990) (on filewith FloridaSecretary

of State).
77. See FLA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 1(a), 9(a) (1999).
78. See TAXING AND BUDGET REaIRM COMM'N, REVISION 4 (1990) (on file with Florida

Secretary of State).
79. How leaseholds created on November 5, 1968, if any, would have been treated for tax
purposes was unstated. This distinction determines whether the tax revenue could be available to
support state governments (i.e., intangible property taxes) or local governments (i.e., tangible
personal property). See FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1999).
80. See FLA. CONST. art. VII, § l(a) (1999).
81. See FLA. CONST. art. VII, § l(a) (1999).
82. See Smith v. American Airlines, Inc., 606 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1992).
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have been susceptible to it if they had been challenged.83
The sum total of the 1990 TBRC's efforts was to add pabulum and
nonconstitutional detail to the basic document of our state. After it
dissolved, the constitution was amended, as described above, to restore
power to CRCs to propose revisions to budgetary and taxation provisions
of the constitution.
While the 1978 CRC was no slacker, the 1998 CRC was the most
ambitious of all the post-1968 constitutional revision commissions.
Rearmed with the authority to review budget and taxation matters as well
as everything else, the 1998 CRC produced thirteen ballot proposals
covering every article of the constitution." Many of these proposals
contained revisions to multiple articles and sections, most of which were
house keeping or window dressing. Not only was the 1998 CRC the most
prolific in the protection of proposals but it was also the most successful
in obtaining voter approval8 5
The 1998 CRC organized its ballot proposals according to substantive
content, grouping what it considered to be similar items under each ballot
question. It also produced a "wildcard" measure containing what it
considered to be only "miscellaneous6 matters and technical revisions"
scattered throughout the constitution.
Revision No. 5 (1998) proposed measures pertaining to "Conservation
of Natural Resources and Creation of Fish and Wildlife Conservation
Commission.""7 This measure was adopted by voters. Its primary
constitutional effect is to expand the law making and executive functions
of the former Game and Freshwater Fish Commission to include marine
animals. It did this by redesignating the commission to be the "Fish and
Wildlife Conservation Commission" and extending its regulatory authority
to "marine life."88 Its former domain extended only tofreshwaterfish. On
the surface this is a "sensible" enlargement of jurisdiction. Below the
83. Particularly, the proposal that amended article V.
84. These were ballot question five through thirteen on the 1996 general election ballot. See
SANDRA B. MORTHAM, SECRETARY OF STATE, PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS AND

REVISIONS TO BE VOTED ON NOVEMBER 3, 1998 (1998) [hereinafter MORTHAM].
85. Why the somewhat similar lineups of ballot proposals in 1998 and the 1978 met such
different fates at the hands of the electorate must be of genuine interest to political scientists. In
both instances this author perceived a public sensibility toward the respective elections that was
fairly predictive of their respective outcomes. In short, public distrust of anything bearing a
governmental character seemed much more pronounced in 1978. Why is not known, but factors
such as the cold war, galloping inflation, energy shortages and uncertainties, and relatively high
joblessness may have been at work in a negative way in 1978. All these factors were reversed in
direction or scope in 1998.
86. For example, rendering the language of the constitution gender neutral was a general goal

of the proposed "technical revision."
87. MORTHAM, supra note 84, at 10-12.
88. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 9 (1999).
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surface, however, the structure and powers of the Fish and Wildlife
Commission make it a curious anomaly in a democratic constitution. The
anomaly arises from how members of the commission are selected and the
strange combination of governmental powers it possesses. First, it is
unelected. 89 Second, it possesses law making powers that are not subject
to the approval or repeal of the Legislature.' ° Third, it possesses the
executive power to enforce the laws it makes. 9 In short, the structure and
powers of the commission not only derogate the tenet that only elected
representatives should possess the power to make laws, but they also
violate the separation of powers principle otherwise imposed upon the state
government of Florida.92 This revision also adopted a measure that imposes
special restraints upon the alienation of lands held by the state for "natural
resource conservation purposes." 93
Revision No. 6 (1998) proposed to add these statements to the
constitution; "the education of children is a fundamental value of the state
of Florida [and] a paramount duty of the state is to make adequate
provision for the education of all children residing within its borders."'94
This provision was adopted, revising Article IX, Section 1 of the Florida
Constitution. Shortly prior to the creation of this proposal, the Florida
Supreme Court had held that Florida's long standing constitutional
mandate that "adequate provision" be made for a "uniform system of free
public schools" did not provide a juridical basis to review the adequacy of
the amount of school funding provided by the Legislature. 95 This measure
is apparently intended to provide a constitutional standard to which the
judiciary may hold the Legislature accountable.9
Revision No. 7 (1998) proposed a "Local option for selection ofjudges
and funding of state courts."' This measure was adopted. 98 A primary
consequence is to permit localities to eliminate popular election of circuit
and county judges in favor of an appointment and retention plan that now

89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See FLA. CONST. art. H,§ 2 (1999).

93. FLA. CONST. art. X (1999). This measure requires a super majority vote to divest the
government of these properties.
94. MORTHAM, supra note 84, at 13.

95. Coalition for Adequacy &Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400 (Fla.

1996).
96. From the author's point of view, this would constitute a regrettable intrusion of an
unelected judiciary into the political decisions of the elected Legislature and an erosion of the
separation of powers premise of article H,section 3 of the Florida Constitution.
97. MORTHAM, supra note 84, at 14.
98. Revision 7 amended article V,sections 10, 11, 12, and 14 of the Florida Constitution.
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applies only to appellate judges. 99 This measure was coupled in a single
ballot question with a dissimilar measure that purports to impose the
"funding for the state court system" on revenues appropriated by the
Legislature."° Less touted by its proponents, this measure also imposes a
constitutional obligation upon county taxpayers to build court houses and
to "pay reasonable and necessary salaries, costs, and expenses of the state
court system to meet local requirements as determined by general laws."101
Hence, the 1998 CRC "log rolled" one provision that it particularly wanted
(that is, elimination ofjudicial elections) with another that it thought would
appeal to local taxpayers as voters (that is, state funding of the judicial
system). What CRC did not trumpet was the constitutionalization of the
obligation of local taxpayers to supply the court houses. Most of this
provision is of non-constitutional character and has the effect of restraining
the Legislature in funding options.
Revision No. 8 (1998) proposed to restructure the state cabinet. 12This
measure was adopted. 3 Its primary effect is to reduce the number of
elected cabinet members from six (that is, secretary of state, attorney
general, comptroller, treasurer, commissioner of agriculture, and
commissioner of education)"° to three (that is, attorney general, chief
financial officer, and commissioner of agriculture.) 0" A presumed goal of
this change was to "strengthen" the office of governor by reducing the
number of cabinet members voting in executive decisions made by the
governor and cabinet sitting as a collegial body. In fact, however, the true
beneficiaries of additional power may turn out to be the three surviving
cabinet officers.' 6 Paradoxically, the 1998 CRC proposed no revision to
the existing measure that permits the Legislature to strip the governor of
virtually all power to administer executive departments of government by
assigning their administration to other officials. 0 7 Revision No. 8 also
stripped "the governor and the members of the cabinet" of the role of "state
board of education" and transferred that function to a newly created seven

99. This proposal reflects a continuing hostility to the idea of electing judges. This hostility
commenced in the commission created under the 1965 statute. See CommissionDraftsConstitution,
41 FLA. B. J. 28 (1967).
100. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 14(a) (1999).
101. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 14(c) (1999).
102. See MORTHAM, supra note 84, at 21-29.

103. Revision 8 revised numerous subsections; particularly article V, section 4 of the Florida
Constitution.
104. See FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (1997).
105. See FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (1999).
106. The revision attempts to mitigate this with this provision: "In the event of a tie vote of
the governor and cabinet, the side on which the governor voted shall be deemed to prevail." FLA.
CONST. art. IV, § 4(a) (as amended in 2003).
107. See FLA. CoNST. art. IV,§ 6 (1999).
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member board to be appointed by the governor and confirmed by the
senate."' This, plus the enlargement of the jurisdiction of the unelected
Game and Fish Commission and the measure permitting retention rather
than contested elections for trial judges, indicates a recurring distrust of
accountability through elections.
Revision No. 9 (1998) proposed to add an "ERA" tone to the equal
protection statement in the declaration of rights by adding the term "female
and male alike" to make it read: "All natural persons, male and female
alike, are equal before the law... ."" This proposal was adopted. 0 The
same measure added "national origin" as a category protected against
arbitrary deprivation of rights, and designated "physical disability" as a
protected category in the place of "physical handicap." ' At this stage of
the evolution of constitutional protections of civil rights, these
modifications are cosmetic.
Revision No. 10 (1998) proposed to modify the power of the
Legislature to grant ad valorem exemptions to leasehold interests in
governmental property, and also proposed an unrelated measure pertaining
to the decisionmaking practices of local governmental officials.' These
measures were intended to cure recent and unfortunate decisions of the
Florida Supreme Court.1 3 This proposal was rejected by the voters, making
it the only 1998 proposal to suffer defeat.
Revision No. 11 (1998) proposed various changes pertaining to suffrage
and elections." 4 This measure was adopted. One portion permits
candidates for governor to run in primary elections prior to having selected
a lieutenant governor." 5 Another measure permits all voters, without
regard to party affiliation, to vote in a party primary election on any
occasion in which only one political party has offered candidates to fill the
particular office."1 6 A third measure constitutionalizes the existing statutory
108. RtA. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (1999).
109. MORTHAM, supra note 84, at 30.
110. Revision 9 amended article I, § 2 of the Florida Constitution (1999).
111. MORTHAM, supra note 84, at 30.
112. See MORTHAM, supra note 84, at 31-32.
113. See generally Canaveral Port Authority v. Department of Revenue, 690 So. 2d 1226
(Fla. 1996) (holding that special districts are not immune to ad valorem taxes); Board of County
Comm'rs of Brevard County v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993) (pertaining to the nature of
local government zoning decisions); Capital City Country Club, Inc. v. Tucker, 613 So. 2d 448
(Fla. 1993) (not approving the measure).
114. MORTHAM, supra note 84, at 33-35.
115. See FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 5(a) (1999). The purpose is to permit primary winners in
gubernatorial elections to choose primary opponents as general election running mates.
116. See FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 5(b) (1999). For example, if only Democratic candidates
qualified to run for governor, then all voters would be permitted to vote in the Democratic primary.
The rationale is that non-Democrats would otherwise have no opportunity at the polls to voice a
preference among the actual candidates for office.
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plan for providing public financing of political campaigns for state wide
offices. 117 The measure made other minor revisions to suffrage and election
provisions.""
Revision No. 12 (1998) proposed to authorize county governments to
enact ordinances requiring sellers of firearms to check the criminal records
of firearm purchasers and to impose waiting periods on the sale of
firearms. 9 This measure was adopted. 20 It exemplifies the use of
constitutional amendments to make (or "authorize") laws that the
Legislature (and county governments) possess the power to enact but had
declined to exercise. If the 1998 CRC believed the "Right to bear arms"
provision of the declaration of rights2' deprives the Legislature of the
power to enact (or authorize counties to enact) these regulations, then it
would have been appropriate to amend the "bear arms" provision to
remove the restriction on the Legislature's power. If the unamended "bear
arms" provision denies the Legislature that power, then the 1998
amendment creates yet another constitutional anomaly; that is, the
amended constitution now permits counties to enact regulations that would
be beyond the power of the Legislature to enact. This is a regrettable
anomaly in the structure of the Florida Constitution.
Revision No. 13 (1998) is the "miscellaneous matters and technical
revisions" provision referred to above.22 This measure was adopted,
making slight revisions in the wording of provisions scattered throughout
the constitution.

I. LEGACY
What is the legacy of the first three "politics-free" commissions as
measured against the substantive changes to the Florida Constitution? The
1978 CRC produced no change, and the 1990 TBRC produced a mass of
words mostly constituting constitutional pabulum. Furthermore, even
though the 1998 CRC successfully tinkered with many sections of the
constitution, few of its products are of genuine constitutional significance.
117. See FLA. STATS. §§ 106.32, et seq. (1999). After the 1998 amendments are all effective,
the state wide offices will be: governor, attorney general; chief financial officer; and commissioner

of agriculture.
118. See generally FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 4(a) (1999) (designating school board elections as
non-partisan); FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (1996) (lowering the voting age from 21 to 18); FLA. CONST.
art. VI, § 1 (putting restrictions on the Legislature's power to put disadvantageous ballot access
requirements on unaffiliated candidates and those from minor parties). Because the 25th
Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees citizens eighteen years of age and older

the right to vote, the voting age matter is wholly cosmetic.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See MORTHAM, supra note 84, at 13.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 5(b) (1999).
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 8 (1999).
MORTHAM, supra note 84, at 37-50.
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Of these few, the 1998 revision to Article IV (reducing the number of
cabinet offices from six to three) and the corollary creation of an appointed
state board of education, may have lasting political consequences. But as
noted above, those changes do not create a "strong" governor, and do not
diminish the Legislature's power to denude the office of governor of power
to administer most of the executive branches of government." They also
perpetuate the constitutional basis for fractioning executive power between
the governor and members of the cabinet, thus continuing to provide only
attenuated political accountability between these officials and the
electorate.
The 1998 "local option" provision for selection and retention of trial
judges may also prove to be politically important. Nevertheless, adopting
this measure avoided, at least for the time being, consideration of different
judicial reforms better designed to create connections-not
disconnections-between thejudiciary and the people. These could include
single member election districts and limited (or, perhaps, extended)
judicial terms. Finally, although many of the "tidy-up" measures adopted
in 1998 may prove beneficial within their limited scopes, all could have
been put on the ballot by the Legislature, and none justifies the convening
of a constitutional revision commission. In sum, the cumulative product of
all these commissions is modest and, in some instances, regrettable.
What did the commission fail to do? It failed to make proposals on
some well-known issues of pure constitutional significance that many of
the electorate would have wished to have seen on the ballot. For example,
nobody proposed to create a truly strong governor. No one proposed to
remove the constitutional prohibition against a personal income tax. And
no member proposed a procedure to permit the electorate to enact state
statutes by initiative and referendum. Consideration of this latter point was
particularly germane in 1998. In the past two decades, Florida citizens have
made ample recourse to the initiative and referendum process to attempt
to amend the constitution, 2A but many of these initiated amendments are
often last resorts to "go over the head" of the Legislature to obtain statutory
objectives through constitutional amendments. 125 Proposing a
constitutional mechanism to permit the people to adopt state statutes with
a less daunting initiative and referendum procedure and with less
permanency for the product would have satisfied a well manifested public
demand.126

123. See FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1999).
124. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (1999).
125. See Joseph W. Little, Does DirectDemocracy Threaten ConstitutionalGovernancein
Florida?,24 STETSON L. REv. 393, 409 (1995).
126. See Richard B. Collins & Dale Oesterle, Structuringthe Ballot Initiative:Proceduresthat
Do and Don't Work, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 47, 129, n.10 (citing at least eight states which permit
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So what needs to be done? First, the method for selecting commission
members needs to change. Here, two somewhat inconsistent imperatives
clash. One is the need for expertly prepared members whose main interest
is the integrity of the constitution as the basic political document of the
state. The other is a selection process that does not favor incumbent
political elites. Inconsistency arises from a clash between the need for
expert commissioners and the evening potential of a broadly democratic
selection process. One might doubt, for example, that the general
population possesses the will or capacity to select impartial experts. As a
compromise, I would start with a proposal for a twenty member revision
commission, one selected from paired, adjacent senatorial districts. The
incumbent legislators from the paired districts would select a member from
the paired districts, each legislator having an equal vote in whatever local
selection process the Legislature might choose to employ.
Second, the scope of each revision commission's work should be
limited. History reflects that the current "every word in the constitution is
fair game for change" authority (particularly of CRCs) results in a "knight
errant" scatter gun search for minutia. Each revision commission should
be forced to concentrate its effort by limiting the scope of its output.
Although calling for a limit is much easier than formulating a workable
plan, I would say that each commission should be authorized to propose no
more than three primary proposals, plus necessary subsidiary revisions that
are strictly necessary to effectuate the primary proposals. Any proposal
that could sensibly stand alone with the aid of only subsidiary proposals
would be deemed to be a primary proposal.
Third, and related to the second, the same "one subject" requirement
that applies to initiated amendments127 should apply to commission
proposals. The 1998 CRC blatantly rolled disparate subjects (the bitter and
the sweet) into single ballot questions and then "politic'd" the voters on the
' This practice should not be permitted.129
merits of the "sweet."128
Fourth, each proposal of a revision commission should be approved by
the Legislature prior to being placed on the ballot. I would not permit the
Legislature to modify proposals; after all, it possesses the power to initiate
proposals by joint resolution 1 3°-but it should be empowered to block
measures deemed wholly unacceptable to a super majority of both houses.

initiated statutes-Alaska, California, Colorado, Idaho, Maine, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming).
A relative virtue of initiated statutes is that, after a prescribed period of time, they may become
subjects of legislative (or initiated) amendments.
127. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (1999).
128. The article V amendments proposed by Revision No. 7 exemplified this.
129. See Kelly H. Arniltage, ConstitutionalRevision CommissionsAvoid Log Rolling, Don't

They?, 73 FLA. B.J. 62 (1998).
130. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (1999).
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Adoption of one or more of the foregoing proposals would lessen the
importance of this measure, but it is worthy of inclusion.
So what is to become of the fabled political neutrality and free scope of
the revision commissions? As to scope, history has shown that a lack of
restraints leads to fractionated attention, a multitude of proposals, and a
tendency to trivialize the dignity of the constitution. Focus should produce
fewer, but more disciplined and principled proposals.
Finally, to the extent the Florida Constitution "needs" a free booting
independent review from time to time, the existing provision for a
constitutional convention13 ' supplies an as yet unexecuted mechanism.
Although I see no need to call a convention within the foreseeable future,
the Legislature might wisely enact legislation to prescribe a means to
finance such a convention should it ever be convened. In the meantime, the
recurring constitution revision commissions (CRCs and TBRCs) should be
reined in to make their work more beneficial to the state. Their practice of
functioning as free-wheeling unelected super-legislatures should be
stopped.

131. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 4 (1999).
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